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Public Funding for Research into Specialty Crops 
1.  Introduction 
Government involvement in agricultural R&D is justified if the benefits exceed the costs.  
Does the private sector neglect socially profitable investments?  So-called market failures in 
R&D can result if inventors are unable to fully appropriate the returns to their inventions—if 
“free-riders” can adopt new technology and benefit from it without having to contribute to the 
costs of research.  In agriculture, in particular, it seems likely that, absent government 
intervention, the private sector will invest too little in certain types of R&D, and there is a strong 
in-principle case for government to intervene either to improve private incentives or, more 
directly, to fund or undertake research.   
In the United States, both state and federal governments are extensively involved in 
agricultural R&D.  Perhaps the most obvious, and arguably the main form of involvement is the 
government production of agricultural science—in government labs or in public Universities—
using general government revenues.  This intervention is justified both in principle and by the 
evidence that the rates of return to public agricultural research have been very high, even with 
very extensive government intervention to correct the private-sector under-investment in 
agricultural R&D (e.g., see Alston et al. 2000).  This suggests that the government intervention 
to date has been inadequate; that the United States could have profitably spent much more on 
agricultural R&D.   
These observations apply to differing extents to different elements of U.S. agricultural 
R&D in aggregate in terms of fields of science, locations of production, or commodity 
orientation of research.  This paper considers public funding for R&D directed to specialty crops.  
Specific questions to be addressed include whether R&D for specialty crops has been under-
funded, both in absolute terms and relative to other crops and agriculture more generally.  First,   2
evidence is presented on past funding patterns and on rates of return; second, implications of that 
evidence in the context of specialty crops production are discussed.  
2.  Trends in U.S. Public Agricultural R&D
1 
In the United States, agricultural research is funded by the federal government through a 
variety of mechanisms.  Historically the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has 
been the primary federal government agency channeling funds to the State Agricultural 
Experiment Stations (SAESs), but that is now changing.
2  In 1970, the USDA disbursed almost 
70 percent of the federal funds flowing to the SAESs, but by 2004 that had declined to less than 
50 percent, with more than half the federal funds now being disbursed by a wide range of federal 
agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and others.  The USDA conducts intramural research, 
mainly through the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in addition to distributing federal funds 
to the SAESs through a combination of formula funds, grants, and contracts. 
Long-Term Trends 
In 1889, shortly after the Hatch Act was passed, federal and state spending appropriations 
totaled $1.12 million.  Over a century later, in 2004 the public agricultural R&D enterprise had 
grown to almost $4.2 billion, an annual rate of growth of 7.7 percent in nominal terms and 4.1 
                                                 
1 This section draws on a forthcoming report by Alston, Anderson, James, and Pardey (2007).    
 
2 While farm acts authorize certain amounts of USDA funds to be used for particular programs, actual expenditures 
are set annually by agricultural appropriations acts.  In the Research Title, appropriated amounts have often differed 
substantially from those authorized.  Several grant programs authorized in earlier Research Titles were not 
appropriated the funds that were expected.  In recent years, Congress has also tended to fund more grants specified 
by members of Congress than the broader grant programs requested by the Administration.   3
percent in real (i.e., inflation adjusted) terms.
3  Intramural USDA and SAES research accounted 
for roughly equal shares of public research spending until the late 1930s, after which the SAES 
share grew to 73 percent of total public spending on agricultural R&D by 2004 (Figure 1).   
[Figure 1: U.S. Public-Sector Agricultural R&D Spending by Performing Agencies] 
Of the funds spent in the SAESs in 2004, 41 percent came from federal sources, 39 
percent from state government, and 20 percent from industry, income earned from sales, 
royalties, and various other sources.  The share of SAES funds coming from federal sources has 
been increasing recently, and the composition of those funds has changed too, with an increase in 
competitive grants and a decline in formula funds (Figure 2).  The public provision of extension 
services in the United States is essentially a state or local activity.  Consequently funds from 
within-state sources accounted for 74 percent of the total funds for extension with federal funds 
accounting for the remaining 26 percent in 2004 (Figure 3). 
[Figure 2: SAES Research Expenditures by Source of Funds] 
[Figure 3: Extension Expenditures by Source of Funds] 
The more recent patterns are of particular interest.  Combined spending on all SAES and 
USDA intramural research grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, averaging an increase of 
2.83 percent per year in real terms over this period.  Since then the growth has generally slowed, 
and become quite erratic.  Total spending on public agricultural R&D grew by just 0.51 percent 
per year during the 1980s, and by 1.18 percent per year from 1990 to 2004 (but by only 0.45 
percent per year during the 1990s followed by 2.65 percent annually from 2000 to 2004).
4  
Federal support for intramural research conducted by the USDA has stagnated, but this has been 
                                                 
3 To convert research spending from nominal values to real terms reflecting the purchasing power of the spending, in 
this report we divide nominal spending by an index of the unit costs of agricultural research, a price index for 
agricultural R&D, documented by Pardey and Andersen (2007).  If we wanted to reflect the opportunity cost of that 
spending we might alternatively deflate by a general price index such as the price deflator for GDP. 
 
4 Similarly, real extension spending grew by 2.3 percent annually during the 1960s and 1970s, slowing to a rate of 
increase of just 0.26 percent per year during the 1980s and then contracting by 0.35 percent per year from 1990 to 
2003 (with the rate of decline accelerating from 0.31 percent per year in the 1990s to 0.45 percent annually during 
the 2000-2003 period).   4
offset by increased federal support for SAES research.  Support for extension has also stagnated 
in real terms, especially federal government support.  In this paper we focus on public spending 
on agricultural research, without specific reference to extension although many of the same 
points would apply to extension.  In addition, unless specific reference is made to private 
research spending, it is being set aside from the discussion for now.
5  Of interest is the extent of 
public support for research into specialty crops and how that has fared in the context of the 
generally evolving patterns of federal and state government support for agricultural R&D.  
3.  Funding for R&D on Specialty Crops 
As shown above, aggregate public spending on agricultural R&D can be broken down 
between intramural USDA spending and SAES spending (some of which is financed from 
federal funds), state by state.  The USDA also compiles information and reports spending on 
commodity-oriented research.  The Current Research Information System (CRIS) database 
contains detailed information of this type, which can be used to examine the pattern of support 
for research, including the allocation among agricultural commodities and various types of other, 
non-commodity research.  These commodity-specific spending figures, like the aggregate 
spending figures, can also be broken down into intramural USDA spending and SAES spending 
(some of which is financed from federal funds), state by state.  In what follows we focus on 
national aggregate figures, rather than state-by-state figures, and examine patterns over time for 
spending on research into crops versus livestock and other research, and then within crops, 
between specialty crops and all other crops.  
                                                 
5 In the United States, private agricultural research spending more than doubled in real terms from 1970 to 2000, and 
private research spending now exceeds public research spending (according to unpublished and updated data 
originally published in Klotz, Fuglie and Pray 1995).  This growth has been associated with improvements in 
intellectual property rights (especially pertaining to plant varieties), and modern biotechnology, among other things.   5
Commodity Orientation of U.S. Public Agricultural Research Spending  
The focus here is on public support for R&D on specialty crops.  The Specialty Crop 
Competitiveness Act of 2004 (PL 108-465) defines specialty crops as:  fruits and vegetables, tree 
nuts, dried fruits, and nursery crops, including floriculture.  The proposed legislation, HR 6193 
“Equitable Agriculture Today for a Healthy America Act” (sometimes referred to as the 
“Specialty Crop Farm Bill”) maintains the definition from the 2004 Competitiveness Act.
6  This 
category includes a long list of crops.  Table 1 lists a selection of these and other crops and 
shows crop-by-crop figures for (a) U.S. planted (or harvested) acreage in 2004, (b) the value of 
U.S. production in 2004, (c) total public spending on research for these crops in 2004, (d) the 
share of that spending undertaken by SAESs (versus the USDA on intramural research), (e) 
public spending on research as a percentage of the gross value of U.S. production in 2004, and 
(f) public spending on research per acre in 2004.   
[Table 1: Specialty Crops Acreage, Production, Value, and Research Expenditures in 2004] 
Specialty crop commodities vary substantially in terms of the size of the industry and the 
size of the corresponding public agricultural research budget, both in absolute terms and relative 
to the size of the industry.  In this section we examine these patterns in depth.  Before doing that, 
to provide some context, we consider the allocation of the total public agricultural research 
budget among different types of research.  Figure 4 and Table 2 show the allocation of total U.S. 
public agricultural R&D spending (including both USDA intramural and SAES expenditure) 
over time between commodity-specific and other (i.e., non-commodity specific) research.  Table 
2 also allocates the research directed towards specific commodities between crops versus 
                                                 
6 A subset of specialty crops are designated as “Mediterranean” crops, which have been defined by the Cal-Med 
consortium as including olives and olive oil; tree nuts; grapes and wine; raisins; vegetables—processed and fresh; 
citrus—processed and fresh; and stone fruits.  The Mediterranean crop definition does not include nursery and 
floriculture, which are included in specialty crops, and it is unclear whether processed fruits and vegetables are 
included in the specialty crop definition contained in the 2004 Competitiveness Act and HR 6193.   6
livestock research; among the major categories within crops (i.e., grains and oilseeds, pasture 
and forage, other crop, and specialty crops); and then among the main categories of specialty 
crops (i.e., fruits and nuts, vegetables, and ornamentals).  The top half of Table 2 includes the 
real (year 2000) dollar values of the expenditures (i.e., nominal values deflated by an index of 
agricultural research costs) while the bottom half of the table includes those expenditures 
expressed as shares of different sub-totals. 
[Figure 4: Allocation of U.S. Public Agricultural R&D Spending, 1975 and 2004]  
[Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Public Agricultural R&D Spending, 1975 to 2004]  
The shares of spending have been fairly constant over time, with no significant 
discernible trend among the main categories.  More substantial changes have been made in the 
allocations within major categories (e.g., consider beef cattle versus other livestock).  Specialty 
crops research has been a fairly constant share of expenditure on crop-specific research (about 35 
percent) which has held a fairly constant but slightly declining share of total research, drifting 
down from 37.8 percent in 1970, to 35.0 percent in 1980 and 34.6 percent in 2004.
7  Combining 
these two effects, the specialty crops share of total public agricultural research spending was 
fairly stable, between 14 and 16 percent over the 25 years 1980 through 2004.  In turn, the 
allocation of specialty crops research among major categories was also fairly stable over the 25 
year period, with roughly equal shares going to fruit and nuts and to vegetables (13 to 16 percent 
each out of the 35 percent spent on crops research) and a smaller share going to ornamentals 
(about 5 to 6 percent of the 35 percent). 
 
 
                                                 
7 Crop-related research accounted for 41 percent of all public-sector agricultural R&D in 2004, several percentage 
points below the share of crop-related R&D in total R&D observed several decades earlier.  Substantial amounts of 
agricultural R&D not specifically reported as crop-related R&D nonetheless have implications for crop production 
generally or a particular crop.   7
Congruence of U.S. Research Spending and Value of Production  
Further insights can be gleaned by considering the commodity-by-commodity 
congruence between research funding and the value of production.  In 2004, the aggregate 
commodity-specific (i.e., crop and livestock) research spending of $2,509 million (including 
$668 million of USDA intramural spending) represented 1.06 percent of the gross value of 
agricultural sales, compared with an overall agricultural research intensity (i.e., including all 
commodity and non-commodity specific research) of 1.53 percent.  This compares with an 
overall intensity of 0.72 percent in 1975.  
In Table 1 there are no readily discernible differences in agricultural research intensity 
ratios between specialty and field crops.  One third (or 3 of 9 commodity areas) of the field crops 
reported in Table 1 had intensities higher than 1.5 percent, and roughly the same share of 
specialty crops (9 of 23) had intensities higher than 1.5 percent.  However, a multitude of minor 
specialty crops have been omitted from this table.   
Figure 5 presents a more comprehensive picture of the evolution of agricultural research 
intensity ratios for broad commodity categories since 1970.  Including all relevant commodities, 
there has been little change around an essentially flat trend line for the intensity of public 
investment in specialty crops research.  In contrast the intensity of investment in grains research 
(and hence all crop research) increased over time.  Likewise, the intensity of investment of 
livestock research has risen as well.  Notably, however, specialty crops had a higher intensity of 
public research investment than (mainly grain) crops subject to price supports under various U.S. 
farm programs from 1970 to about the late 1990s (Figure 5).
8  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the intensity of R&D investment in program crops exceeded that for specialty crops, but by 2004 
                                                 
8 “Program crops” include corn, soybeans, upland cotton, wheat, rice, feed grains (barley, oats, and grain sorghum) 
peanuts, oilseeds, lentils, chickpeas, and dry edible beans.  Grain crops include barley, buckwheat, cowpeas, rice, 
millet, corn, wheat, sorghum, oats, rye and other small grains 
   8
the gap had narrowed such that program and specialty crops had much the same intensity of 
R&D investment.  The total research intensity ratio expresses all public agricultural R&D—i.e., 
including research targeted to specific commodities plus all non-commodity R&D—relative to 
the total value of agricultural sales.  This ratio rose steadily from 0.82 percent in 1970 to 1.53 
percent in 2004, about 45 percent higher than the corresponding 2004 intensity of investment in 
commodity specific R&D (Figure 5, Panel b).  This pattern is consistent with the finding (see 
Table 2) that a sizable, and of late growing, share of public agricultural R&D does not target 
specific commodities.  The U.S. public agricultural research agenda has increasingly focused on 
concerns such as food safety, food security, and the environmental implications of agriculture 
that have little if any impact on enhancing or even maintaining farm-level productivity.
9  
[Figure 5: Agricultural Research Intensities, 1970-2004]  
Figure 6 provides more commodity-specific detail on the pattern of agricultural output 
and the amount and intensity of public research spending for 2004.  The figures for total 
spending over time on crop-specific research were broken down between SAES and USDA 
intramural research spending, and the agricultural research intensities were computed by dividing 
the total crop-specific research spending and its SAES and USDA intramural elements by the 
gross value of sales.  To understand all of these patterns is a large assignment towards which we 
can only make partial progress here.  
[Figure 6: Commodity Specific Output, Research Spending, and Research Intensity in 2004]  
Comparing the right and left hand panels of Figure 6, there is an apparent but loose 
concordance between the value of crop sales and the amount of public R&D spending—higher-
valued crops garner greater R&D spending.  However, the amount of R&D spending does not 
rise uniformly with the value of crop sales.  In Figure 6, the most valuable crop categories 
                                                 
9 See Alston and Pardey (2007) for more discussion and details on this aspect of the changing U.S. agricultural R&D 
agenda.    9
(specifically corn, soybeans, and ornamentals and nursery) have especially low intensities of 
R&D spending compared with almost all of the lower-valued crop categories in this figure.  
Turning back to Table 1, we also see that large-acreage field crops have comparatively low 
public research spending per acre (and especially corn, wheat and soybeans, where less than two 
dollars per acre is spent on publicly performed R&D) while, for the smaller-acreage specialty 
crops, research spending per acre often exceeds 20 dollars, and in quite a few cases more than 40 
dollars.  These spending patterns suggest there may be economies of scale and size in research—
solving a production problem for one acre solves it for all similar acres for any given crop.
10 
The site specificity of many crop production problems means that the location matters as 
well as the amount of acres.  Crop acreage in a given location is likely to experience the same or 
similar production constraints as acres for the same crop in a physically different but 
agroecologically similar location.  Moreover, crops that are grown in close proximity are usually 
(but not always) more likely to share similar agroecological attributes than if they were grown in 
distant locations.  Figure 7 plots the cumulative distribution of R&D spending and the value of 
agricultural sales across the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  Specialty crop output is concentrated in 
fewer states than crops generally, and certainly compared with all agricultural output.  For 
example, the top five specialty crops producing states account for 65 percent of the U.S. total 
value of specialty crops marketings but the top five agricultural states account for only 35 
percent of the value of agricultural sales. 
[Figure 7:  Spatial Distribution of Agricultural Sales Values and SAES Research Spending, 2004]  
                                                 
10 Ruttan (1983) observed that research intensities were comparatively high for a number of smaller crops and 
questioned whether this allocation of research resources made economic sense.   10
4.  The Economics of Specialty Crops R&D  
This section presents theoretical arguments about the role for government in specialty 
crops R&D, versus other agricultural R&D, that may help explain the patterns of research 
investments.  These arguments are supported with evidence from the literature on rates of return 
to different types of agricultural research and some analysis of patterns of crop-specific 
productivity growth and price patterns.  
Economic Arguments 
In the absence of other information, a first approach to allocating agricultural research 
resources is to use a congruence rule, as discussed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995, pp. 488-
490).  Specifically, allocating public commodity-specific agricultural research resources strictly 
in proportion to the value of production (or sales) would lead to equal agricultural research 
intensities across all industries.  Comparing specialty crops in aggregate with other crops, the 
agricultural research intensity for specialty crops is comparable now but has fallen in relative 
terms over time.  Agricultural research intensities for specialty crops are comparatively low once 
we account for the fact that the research intensity tends to be inversely related with industry size, 
and the value of production of individual specialty crops is generally low. 
The fact that actual agricultural research intensities are not congruent might reflect a 
number of factors at work.  One possible interpretation is that research resources have been 
misallocated relative to maximizing the national social returns; that too little has been spent on 
specialty crops research either because of government failure owing to incomplete information, 
or as a reflection of the politics of research funding processes in which other commodity interests 
have been more influential.  An alternative interpretation is that a lower public agricultural 
research intensity is warranted because the payoff to research on specialty crops could be   11
expected to be comparatively low.  For instance, differences in determinants of research benefits, 
including the size of the industry to which research results will be applicable, and differences in 
research costs, together mean that some industries have higher net research payoffs justifying 
higher rates of investment, everything else equal.  This latter possibility is the focus of much of 
this section in which we consider theoretical arguments about the determinants of the likely 
payoff to public research investments, and some empirical evidence.  
We do not propose to go deeply into the political economy of research funding.  
However, we do note that specialty crops have some features that seem likely to have influenced 
the agricultural research intensities regardless of the relative payoffs to different types of 
research.  First, producers of specialty crops may have comparatively low political influence 
compared with producers of some of the larger crops owing to (a) the small individual 
importance of each specialty crop, (b) low relative importance of specialty crops collectively in 
the economics and politics of the states where they are grown, and (c) the diverse interests 
among different specialty crops.  In addition, production of individual specialty crops tends to be 
comparatively concentrated geographically (with many of the crops produced mostly if not 
entirely in one state or only a few states); thus they have limited interstate research spillover 
potential, which reduces the justification for federal government involvement.  Finally, specialty 
crops agricultural research intensities may be comparatively low simply as a reflection of the 
effects of inertia in research spending patterns during a period when the denominator (the value 
of production or sales) in the agricultural research intensity ratio has been growing relatively 
quickly for specialty crops compared with other commodities.
11  These and other political factors 
                                                 
11 The rate of growth in the intensity of specialty crop research from 1975 to 2004 of 0.7 percent per year represents 
an annual 5.41 percent increase in nominal spending on specialty crops research and an annual 6.04 percent increase 
in the value of sales.  This compares with a 6.37 percent increase per year in investments in public research in all 
other crops whose value of sales grew by 2.08 percent per year.    12
should be borne in mind along with the determinants of the costs and benefits that are considered 
next.  
Some simple economic arguments do not favor (public) investments in specialty crops 
research.  As shown by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995), the gross annual research benefits 
(GARB) to society from a given research-induced productivity gain are roughly proportional to 
the value of production (V): for a 100 k percent improvement in productivity, GARB ≈ kV.  In 
addition, the benefits accruing to private researchers from certain types of (appropriable) 
innovations increase with increases in the acreage of production to which they will apply.  Thus, 
other factors equal, we would expect to find a comparatively low social and private payoff to 
R&D on individual specialty crops owing to the comparatively small size of production in terms 
of both area grown and value of production.  In addition, a number of specialty crops face market 
conditions that are different from those for the stereotypical agricultural commodity (an annual, 
comparatively non-perishable crop that is internationally traded and for which demand facing the 
United States is fairly elastic, such that changes in U.S. production would have small effects on 
prices) and which mean research benefits are lower for producers and the nation.  In the case of a 
crop like almonds, for instance, California faces a comparatively inelastic demand, which means 
that a significant share of research benefits go to consumers, a large share of whom are not in 
California or the United States.  Thus, for a given total benefit, the benefits to producers, the 
state, and the nation are smaller.  In addition, the perennial crop nature of almonds means that 
new technologies embodied in trees or certain other capital inputs can only be adopted at the 
time of new planting or replanting, and this influences the distribution of benefits and the 
incentives of producers to spend resources on developing new technologies.
12    
                                                 
12 Alston (2002b) discusses some general issues related to the implications of mis-matching of distributions of 
research benefits and costs for incentives, and refers specifically to this type of intertemporal mis-matching. 
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On the cost side, too, the conditions might not favor certain specialty crops research.  
Achieving a given research-induced productivity gain is likely to be more expensive for 
perennial crops (a large proportion of the fruit and tree nut categories within specialty crops are 
perennial) compared with annual crops (like vegetables and field crops generally) both because 
the individual experimental units are larger and more expensive and because research takes 
longer; and possibly for other reasons related to the biology of the plants and related scientific 
opportunities.  In addition, there are some fixed cost components to the innovation process—
including costs of compliance with regulatory processes that are onerous for pesticides and other 
chemical innovations and even more so for biotech crop varieties.
13  These factors mean that 
private research investors are less likely to find it profitable to invest in developing proprietary 
technologies for smaller-scale industries in general.  Consequently, smaller-scale commodities 
are tending to become technological orphans both because of the effects of the size of the market 
(especially when we allow for buyer resistance to products certain types of technologies) and 
because of the overhead costs of R&D and regulatory compliance, both of which tend to favor 
research targeted towards the larger-scale commodities.  Alston (2004) also makes the point, 
which is also relevant here, that the same factors that discourage private investment make the 
same investment less attractive to society as well, such that the lack of private investment does 
not necessarily mean that the government should invest to compensate. 
These factors combined may mean that, everything else equal, we might anticipate  
relatively low private and social rates of return to research into specialty crops, and especially 
perennial crops, which could help justify a comparatively low public agricultural research 
intensity.  But everything else is not equal, and a number of other factors could have contributed 
to a greater market failure and underinvestment in specialty crops research compared with 
                                                 
13 Kalaitzandonakes, Alston, and Bradford (2006) estimated that the costs of complying with U.S. regulations for a 
new biotech crop variety range between $6 million and $16 million, which is very large relative to the potential 
value of such technology in many of the smaller specialty crop industries.     14
agricultural R&D more generally.  If so, everything else equal, perhaps the government should 
invest relatively more in specialty crops R&D to compensate or should intervene in other ways 
to encourage more specialty crops research.   
Sources of Market Failure 
Why might there be a greater market failure in specialty crops research than in other 
commodity-specific research?  First, the basic economic arguments made above—concerning 
effects of scale and size of the market, and so on—might mean that the incentives for private 
agricultural research investments related to specialty crops, and especially perennial crops, may 
be even more attenuated than those related to larger scale field crops like grains, oilseeds, or 
cotton.  Whether this is so may depend on other determinants of incentives for research 
investments, especially the relevant intellectual property protection and other factors that 
determine the extent to which the returns to invention can be appropriated, including the degree 
to which the industry is concentrated in the production or marketing of the commodity in 
question.
14  Second, other forms of market failure, other than those related to research per se, 
may be important for specialty crops and may mean that the social payoff to research is higher 
than may be indicated otherwise.  Potential sources of such distortions include aspects of 
production (including positive and negative environmental externalities associated with 
landscape amenities, and pollution of air and groundwater associated with the use of agricultural 
chemicals and irrigation), and aspects of consumption (including negative externalities through 
                                                 
14 Data on concentration ratios in the food industry may be relevant.  A number of specialty crops industries have 
cooperatives that handle a significant share of production and some have marketing orders that are authorized to 
conduct marketing activities and to raise funds for industry collective goods, including agricultural research (e.g., 
see Carman and Alston 2005).  A substantial amount of the intellectual property rights concerning plants in the 
United States pertain to specialty rather than field crops.  Summing the total number of U.S. rights granted in the 
form of plant patents, varietal related utility patents, and plant variety protection certificates, Koo et al. (2007) report 
that only 22 percent of those rights related to cereal and oilseed crops.  Specialty crops account for 71 percent of the 
total, with ornamental plants alone accounting for half of all the rights granted. 
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the healthcare and health insurance system associated with diseases and illness that may be 
reduced by consumption of specialty crops).   
Among these possible reasons, consumption externalities are the most credible given the 
scale of human health problems in the United States related to diet and nutrition and the related 
social costs, the distortions in incentives inherent in the health care system in the presence of 
insurance, and the potential for specialty crops to contribute to more-healthy diets and thereby to 
reduce both the private and social costs of diet-related illness.  The available time-series data 
indicate that over the period 1949-2004 farm and wholesale prices of fruits and vegetables did 
not fall as fast as the corresponding prices for agricultural commodities more generally and that, 
therefore, relative prices have moved against a healthier diet.  This may have contributed to the 
current so-called epidemic of obesity.  Of more potential relevance is the suggestion that the 
allocation of a greater proportion of the available research funds towards specialty crops could 
enhance productivity growth in, and a relative price decline for, specialty crops resulting in 
favorable effects on Americans’ diets and significant social payoff through human health 
impacts.
15  The direction of these effects is clear but the quantitative importance is a matter for 
further research.  
Rates of Return to Specialty Crops R&D 
Previous studies have found a high private rate of return to agricultural research in 
general, and an even higher social rate of return.  These findings support the argument that 
government intervention has been inadequate; that (even with the substantial government 
intervention) the observation of high rates of return means that even more money could have 
                                                 
15 Alston, Sumner, and Vosti (2006) and Alston, Vosti, Sumner, and Kish (2007) documented and discussed these 
relative price trends, the role of government policy, and the possible implications for obesity.  They concluded that 
other factors were relatively important contributors to the rise of obesity, but that an increased emphasis of R&D on 
specialty crops might help slow that growth.  See, also, Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003); Philipson and Posner 
(2003); Ladwalla, Philipson, and Battacharya (2005); and Gelbach, Klick, and Stratmann (2007).    16
been invested profitably in agricultural R&D.  Similar arguments can be made with respect to 
particular types of agricultural R&D.  A rate of return above the social opportunity cost of funds 
indicates an underinvestment in some absolute sense.  A high rate of return on research into, say, 
specialty crops relative to other types of agricultural research would indicate a relative 
underinvestment: that it would have been profitable to have spent a larger share of the given total 
on specialty crops.  Against that background, what does the evidence in the literature say about 
the private and social returns to research on specialty crops compared with the social opportunity 
cost of funds and compared with investments in other types of agricultural R&D? 
Alston et al. (2000) reviewed the extant evidence on the rates of return to agricultural 
research.  They compiled a total of 289 studies of returns to agricultural R&D (including 
extension), which provided 1,821 separate estimates of rates of return.  For the present purpose 
we selected a subset of those estimates comprising (a) all estimates of rates of return to research 
related to specialty crops, separated into potatoes and other specialty crops, and (b) for 
comparison, estimates of rates of return to U.S. research on other (i.e., non-specialty) crops.  We 
included estimates of returns to research done in other countries as well as U.S. research for 
specialty crops, but not for the other types of crop research.  To narrow the basis for comparison, 
we excluded estimates of returns to extension.  Table 3 reports some summary statistics on these 
selected estimates after we excluded as outliers all estimates of rates of return greater than 100 
percent per annum, which were more prevalent for crops research than for specialty crops 
research.  Appendix Table A1 contains more complete information on the studies in question.   
[Table 3: Rates of Return to Specialty Crops and Other Crops Research] 
It can be seen in Table 3 that the range of estimates of rates of return to specialty crops 
research falls generally within the range of estimates for crops research generally.  As reported 
by Alston et al. (2000) in their meta-analysis, the signal-to-noise ratio is low such that it is   17
difficult to identify statistically significant differences among estimates of rates of return to 
research according to particular characteristics of the research being evaluated—such as the 
nature of the commodity to which it applies.  That general observation appears to apply to the 
comparison of returns to research on specialty crops versus other types of research.  Further, the 
studies of research on specialty crops tended to focus on a small number of commodities (such as 
potatoes or certain tropical products) to the extent that the results may not be representative of 
the past returns to research on specialty crops in the United States, most of which were not 
represented in the studies cited.  Thus, whilst there is no evidence from estimates of research 
benefits to indicate that specialty crops research has been less profitable than other types of 
agricultural research, nor is there any evidence from the same set of estimates to support a claim 
that specialty crops research was significantly more profitable and therefore inappropriately 
neglected. 
Importantly, however, these estimates did not include any allowance for human health 
benefits from increased consumption of fruit and vegetables resulting from research-induced 
reductions in prices of fruit and vegetables.  This dimension of potential benefits from research 
into specialty crops could be large, if research-induced price changes could be expected to 
contribute significantly to improved dietary quality and lower rates of obesity, and if so the rates 
of return may have been seriously understated.
16  Further, this factor changes the argument for 
public policy since some of the benefits would be associated with reductions in externalities in 
                                                 
16 Work has begun in this area and results to date support the view that consumption and measures of obesity such as 
the “body mass index” are affected by relative prices of “healthy” and “unhealthy” foods—e.g., see Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Shapiro (2003); Philipson and Posner (2003); Ladwalla, Philipson, and Battacharya (2005); and Gelbach, Klick, 
and Stratmann (2007).  Further work is needed to establish and quantify the links from R&D to relative prices, from 
price-induced changes in consumption and obesity to health outcomes, and from there to dollar values of social costs 
(e.g., as done by Gray and Malla 1998, 2001).  A key point is that only very small changes in health outcomes will 
generate very large benefits relative to national expenditures on agricultural research.  Results from Cash, Sunding, 
and Zilberman (2005) would support the conjecture that comparatively small research- (or subsidy-) induced 
changes in relative prices and consumption of fruit and vegetables would generate large net benefits through health 
impacts.   
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the health care system that would be ignored by the private sector in choosing research 
investments.   
Prices and Productivity Growth for Specialty Crops 
An examination of past changes in prices and production of specialty crops compared 
with other crops may yield some insight about the relative growth of supply and demand, and 
thus, indirectly, about the relative contributions of productivity growth among the different 
sectors.  As shown in Figure 8, specialty crops have grown in importance relative to other crops 
and livestock; the specialty crops share of agricultural output value grew from 8.7 percent in 
1949 to more than 21.3 percent in 2004.
17  Within specialty crops, the value shares of both 
ornamentals and fruits and nuts grew a little faster than the value share of vegetables. 
[Figure 8:  Value of Specialty Crops as a Share of U.S. Agricultural Production] 
Part of the reason for the increase in value share has been the change in relative prices.  
Panel a, Figure 9, shows the nominal prices for the main product categories.  The prices of 
specialty crops have grown both absolutely and relative to field crops and livestock products, 
which have had fairly static nominal prices for the 20 years prior to 2004 in spite of general cost 
inflation.
18  Panel b, Figure 9 shows the same price series deflated by an index of prices received 
by farmers and in Panel c specialty crops prices are deflated by the implicit price deflator for 
gross domestic product (representing prices generally in the economy).  Figure 10 shows the 
corresponding (Panel c) average annual rate of change in deflated output prices for the 1950-
2004 period.  Prices received by farmers for all crop categories trend down relative to prices paid 
by consumers for all goods and services.  The increase in consumption could be accounted for by 
                                                 
17 Specialty crops grew from 17.7 percent of the total value of crop production in 1949 to 41.2 percent in 2004. 
 
18 As discussed by Alston, Sumner, and Vosti (2006), and Alston, Vosti, Sumner, and Kish (2007), some of these 
price increases for specialty crops might reflect premia for changes in quality, variety, or seasonal availability, 
which might not have been fully addressed in the indexing procedure.  This possibility is a subject for continuing 
research, and is set aside for the time being.     19
the lower real price or growth in demand, or a combination of the two.  The increase in 
production in spite of lower real producer prices indicates that productivity must have increased.   
[Figure 9:  Prices of Specialty Crops—Nominal and Real Values, 1949-2004] 
[Figure 10:  Real Movement in Prices of Specialty Crops, 1949-2004 annual averages] 
A first impulse may be to assume that, since prices have fallen faster for other products 
(i.e., field crops and livestock), the rate of productivity growth must have been comparatively 
slow for specialty crops, suggestive of a comparative underinvestment in productivity-enhancing 
research for specialty crops.  However, such an interpretation may not be justified.  More 
specific interpretations are possible if we have more information.  Specifically, if we know the 
elasticity of supply, we can partition changes in production into those associated with changes in 
prices and those associated with changes in the quantity supplied; and if we know the price 
elasticity of demand, we can partition changes in consumption into those associated with changes 
in prices and those associated with changes in quantities demanded.  Here, we are mainly 
interested in the supply side.  The indexes of prices and quantity for the different categories of 
output grew at different rates over the period 1949 through 2004, as summarized in Table 4.  The 
indexes all started at 100 in 1949.  By 2004 the quantity indexes had reached 212 for livestock 
(i.e., the index grew by 112 percent), 278 for field crops, 262 for vegetables, 283 for fruits and 
nuts, and 742 for nursery and greenhouse marketing.  In contrast, the corresponding price 
indexes were 307 for livestock, 190 for field crops, 489 for vegetables, 519 for fruits and nuts, 
and 534 for nursery and greenhouse marketing.  Dividing by the GDP deflator, which had grown 
from 1.0 in 1949 to 6.69 in 2004, the corresponding real price indexes were 45.9 for livestock, 
28.4 for field crops, 73.1 for vegetables, 77.5 for fruits and nuts, and 79.8 for nursery and 
greenhouse marketing.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the relevant elasticity of supply is 
ε = 1.0 (a value of ε = X means that a 1 percent increase in price would call forth an X percent 
increase in production).  A real price index of 45.9 for livestock in 2004 indicates a price   20
decrease of 55.1 percent since 1949, which given ε = 1.0, ceteris paribus, would imply a 55.1 
percent decrease in quantity supplied.  Subtracting the price-induced change in quantity supplied 
(– 55.1 percent) from the overall observed growth in quantity (112 percent) implies an increase 
in livestock supply of 167.1 percent (i.e., 112 – (– 55.1) = 167.1 percent).  Table 4 reports the 
corresponding computations for each category of production using an elasticity of supply of 
either ε = 1.0 or ε = 0.5.   
[Table 4:  Growth in Production and Prices for Agricultural Products, 1949–2004]  
Considering the estimates made using an elasticity of ε = 1.0, the computed growth rates 
of supply of vegetables as well as fruits and nuts fall in between those of livestock and field 
crops.  Only greenhouse and nursery is outside the typical range for livestock and other crops.  
When we use an elasticity of ε = 0.5 instead, the differences in the computed growth rates of 
supply are reduced.  In either case, with the exception of nursery and greenhouse, which has 
been growing much faster but from a very small base, supply of specialty crops has been 
growing at a rate similar to that for the supply of U.S. agricultural products generally.  Thus there 
is not a prima facie case to suggest that specialty crops have been technological orphans.  Of 
course, we have not identified the source of the growth in supply, and it might be mostly from 
capital investment in fruit and nuts, and mostly from new technology in field crops, but whether 
that is so remains a matter of speculation for now.
19   
Collective Action as a Correction for Incentive Problems 
A case can be made that an increase in the rate of investment in specialty crops research 
would be profitable for both the industry and society more generally (whether from the 
viewpoint of the nation or the state of California that produces many of the specialty crops 
                                                 
19 Data on yields per acre, or other partial productivity measures, and acreage planted to the different crops may 
provide some further insight into the sources of growth.  This is a subject for continuing research. 
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considered here).  And, to the extent that inter-industry spillovers of technology or health-care 
externalities are important sources of benefits, a further case can be made for contributions by 
the state or federal governments to reinforce investments that the industry finds profitable to 
make.  Industry advocates have suggested that the annual public investment should be a billion 
dollars, roughly twice the current amount.  However, a substantially increased commitment of 
federal or state government funds to specialty crops research must come at the expense of other 
government priorities, and may be hard to secure on an enduring basis, if at all.
20  In its proposal 
for the 2007 Farm Bill, the USDA proposed an additional $100 million per year for specialty 
crops research, and even this amount may be hard to secure.
21 
An alternative approach, combining collective action by industry with support from 
government, may be more effective as a way of securing a long-term commitment of funding 
support, and may be a fairer and economically more efficient way to finance an increase in 
specialty crops research funding.  Specifically, rather than intervene directly, the government 
could establish institutions whereby the industry itself could raise research funds using 
commodity levies supported by matching government grants.
22  In Australia, this approach has 
proven very successful as a way of locking in government support for commodity-oriented 
agricultural research, and has allowed substantial growth in total funding, to the point where the 
Research and Development Corporations (RDCs) now drive the total agricultural research 
activity in Australia.  
                                                 
20 The gross evidence presented here does not clearly support shifting the balance of existing research resources 
towards specialty crops.  A shift of that magnitude would not go un-noticed by the others interested in the allocation 
of public agricultural research resources.  On the other hand, half a billion dollars is much smaller as a share of 
spending on farm commodity programs and the like, with recent annual spending in the range of $20 billion, more 
than 10 times the federal commitment to agricultural research. 
 
21 Details on the USDA 2007 Farm Bill Proposals can be found on the USDA Economic Research Service web site, 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/FarmBill2007/ (accessed May 20, 2007). 
 
22 These policies are discussed in detail by Alston and Pardey (1996) and Alston Pardey and Smith (1999), and more 
recently by Alston (2002) and Alston, Freebairn and James (2003, 2004).   22
As documented by Carman and Alston (2005), California specialty crops producers are 
quite willing to tax themselves to finance industry collective goods such as standards, inspection, 
research, and commodity advertising and promotion, even without the additional incentive 
provided by matching government grants.  As shown in Table 5, in 2002 54.8 percent of 
California agricultural production was subject to a mandated marketing program; the percentage 
was much higher for fruits and nuts (73.5 percent), but somewhat lower for vegetables (43.1 
percent).  As shown in Table 6, these programs spent over $200 million in 2002.  Of that total 
perhaps one quarter was spent on programs for livestock and field crops, which leaves $150 
million for specialty crops; but very little of that money was spent on agricultural research, in the 
range of one-tenth of the total.  
[Table 5:  California Commodities Covered by Marketing Programs, 2002] 
[Table 6:  Expenditure by California Marketing Programs, 2002] 
Rather than simply press for an increased amount of funding for specialty crops research 
to be provided in the conventional fashion—to be diverted from alternative allocations on other 
research or from other parts of the farm bill—it might be more effective to develop a proposal 
for joint public-private funding of a substantial increase in specialty crops research using the 
Australian RDC model as a template, but perhaps in the context of the legal framework under 
which marketing orders and like institutions are created in the United States.  
5.  Conclusion 
Specialty crops have become increasingly important relative to other categories of 
agricultural production in the United States over the past 50 years, especially during the past 25 
years.  The growth in the value of production of specialty crops has not been matched by 
commensurate growth in public agricultural research spending.  The specialty crops share of 
spending on crops research (or on all agricultural research) has remained approximately constant   23
during a period when the specialty crops share of the value of production has increased 
significantly.  In addition, the agricultural research intensity ratio for specialty crops— 
expressing research spending as a share of the corresponding value of output—changed little 
over the past several decades, while agricultural research intensities were rising generally.  Thus, 
the relative intensity for specialty crops has fallen.  By 2004, the R&D investment intensities for 
specialty and program crops were roughly equal, though for many years there was substantially 
more intensive R&D investment in specialty crops than in crops research generally (or program 
crops in particular).  However, this overall picture masks a great deal of variation among crops 
within the category specialty crops.  
Everything else equal, and in the absence of better information, research funding could 
be based on a congruence rule.  Such a rule would dictate equal research intensities among all 
agricultural commodities, and to achieve this outcome would require increasing the share of 
spending allocated to some specialty crops (and lowering it for some others).  Such a congruence 
rule may not be appropriate for specialty crops.  Research on some specialty crops may have a 
relatively low private or social payoff because the acreage and value of production of individual 
commodities are relatively small, which limits the potential for taking advantage of economies of 
scale in research and in adoption of the results from research unless there are substantial 
economies of scope among specialty crops research projects.  On the other hand, for similar 
reasons, the extent of market failure from private sector neglect of research opportunity may 
mean that there is a comparatively high social rate of return to public investment in research on 
specialty crops.  There is limited direct evidence available to support either of these conjectures.   
In 2004, a little over half a billion dollars was spent on research directly related to 
specialty crops, which amounted to almost 14 percent of total public agricultural research 
spending and a little over 20 percent of spending for public research on crops and livestock.    24
These recent broad allocations have been approximately consistent with a broad congruence rule.  
In addition, relative growth rates of supply (or perhaps productivity) have been comparable 
between specialty crops and the rest of agriculture—with the exception of the very rapidly 
growing greenhouse and nursery products—, a pattern that is not obviously inconsistent with a 
balance existing in the allocation of research resources.  Finally, the available evidence is 
consistent with a view that research on specialty crops has yielded rates of return comparable to 
research on other crops, though these results relate mainly to research on comparatively large-
scale commodities, such as potatoes.  Taken together, these observations do not provide support 
for a major shift in the allocation of public agricultural research resources towards specialty 
crops.  
An additional argument can be made that research on some specialty crops may have a 
larger social rate of return if it makes fruit and vegetables cheaper and therefore contributes to 
encouraging Americans to eat healthier diets.  This effect alone is not sufficient to justify a 
policy shift.  There must also be a market distortion in health care that entails a negative 
externality (a social cost not borne by private individuals) that would be reduced as a result of 
specialty-crops research.  Direct evidence on that issue is not available either, but the social costs 
of the health care system are sufficiently large that only a small improvement caused by 
research-induced dietary change would be sufficient to justify sizable increases in agricultural 
research spending (e.g., see Gray and Malla 1998, 2001).  One might argue, however, that, if 
agricultural science is to be used as an instrument of public health policy in this way, the funding 
ought to be provided by other arms of the government, such as the NIH, rather than by the 
USDA or as an earmarked component of Title 7 of the U.S. Farm Bill. 
The U.S. government could act in a number of ways to enhance specialty crops research.  
One option would be simply to redirect funding that would otherwise be spent on other types of   25
agricultural research or on farm commodity programs.  Alternatively, the government could seek 
to encourage collective action to be undertaken by commodity groups.  Specialty crops producers 
are very actively engaged in check-off-funded programs, but they spend the lion’s share of the 
funds they raise on commodity promotion programs.  These promotion programs have been 
subject to controversy and litigation.  The Australian government offers matching grants for 
levy-funded research and this policy has facilitated a very significant growth in commodity-
specific research managed by producers with joint funding by industry and government.  State 
governments could also develop programs of this type to enhance funding support for specialty 
crops research or, indeed, any type of commodity specific research that has a natural funding 
base.    26
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Source: SAES series extracted from CRIS data tapes and USDA’s Inventory of Agricultural Research 
publications. USDA Intramural series developed from unpublished USDA budget reports.   
Note: Nominal research expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in  
Pardey and Andersen (2007).  SAES Total includes 48 contiguous states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii which 
totaled $27.36 million in 2004 (or $24.5 million in 2000 prices)—just 0.85 percent of the 50 state total.  These 
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Source: SAES series extracted from CRIS data tapes and USDA’s Inventory of Agricultural Research 
publications.  USDA Intramural series developed from unpublished USDA budget reports.  See Pardey and 
Andersen (2007) for details. 
Note: Nominal research expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in 
Pardey and Andersen (2007).  The data included here refer to the source of funds for all the R&D performed 
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Source:  See Pardey and Andersen (2007) for details. 
Note: Nominal extension expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in 
Pardey and Andersen (2007). 
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Table 1: Specialty Crops Acreage, Production, Value, and Research Expenditures in 2004 












as a Share of 




   
1000 
acres  1000 US$  1000 US$  -------- Percent --------  US$/ac 
Specialty crops            
 Vegetables             
    Tomato (fresh and processed)  770  2,156,518   33,782  75.9              1.57   43.89 
    Potato  1,193  2,384,178   43,854  59.6              1.84   36.75 
    Greens and leafy vegetables  319  2,223,078   12,652  67.2              0.57   39.71 
    Carrot  117  111,560   3,157  69.0              2.83   27.04 
    Peppers  57  518,344   7,260  65.1              1.40   127.14 
    Onion, garlic, leek, shallot    1,134,280   5,227  82.1              0.46    
    Beans  1,354  438,794   9,632  85.6              2.20   7.11 
    Mushrooms    606,373   2,167  94.0              0.36    
               
  Fruits and nuts             
    Grapes (fresh, dried and wine)  933  3,003,553  34,527  62.1              1.15   37.00 
    Apples  386  1,766,698  29,712  64.5              1.68   76.88 
    Pears  64  286,286  5,450  41.3              1.90   84.95 
    Peaches  146  461,624  10,648  59.7              2.31   73.16 
    Cherries  115  507,074  4,918  68.8              0.97   42.68 
    Other stone fruits     323,387  12,736  65.4              3.94    
    Oranges  761  1,714,499  9,051  40.1              0.53   11.89 
    Lemons  60  304,558  1,692  43.9              0.56   28.29 
    Strawberries  52  1,460,362  12,477  61.8              0.85   241.80 
    Other berries    904,145  11,904  67.1              1.32    
    Almonds  550  2,189,005  2,705  45.6              0.12   4.92 
    Walnuts  217  451,750  2,259  59.5              0.50   10.41 
               
  Ornamentals and Nursery             
    Trees and shrubs    499,323  23,125  66.6              4.63    
  Potted  plants      6,189  75.9     
    Cut flowers, foliage and greens    5,215,192  2,989  92.1              0.06    
    Other ornamentals and nursery    9,995,965  53,001  91.0              0.53    
            
Other Crops            
  Grains,  oilseeds, and sugar             
    Corn  80,929 21,199,263  121,584  57.8              0.57   1.50 
    Wheat  59,674 7,123,970  102,665  62.5              1.44   1.72 
    Rice  3,347  1,768,284  46,050  73.7              2.60   13.76 
    Barley  4,527  597,959  20,138  58.2              3.37   4.45 
    Sorghum  7,486  818,000  20,239  63.4              2.47   2.70 
    Sugar beets  1,346  1,106,878  11,533  33.6              1.04   8.57 
    Sugar cane    864,479  12,948  45.3              1.50    
    Soybeans  75,208 16,441,344  103,790  67.5              0.63   1.38 
    Other grain and oilseeds  6,981  6,940,046  87,498  65.0              1.26   12.53 
Total Crops    113,684,233 1,488,877  68.2  1.31   
Source: U.S. planted acreage downloaded from NASS (www.nass.usda.gov); Value of sales (cash receipts) U.S. 
Production: USDA-ERS farm cash receipts data downloaded from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/FarmIncome/;Total Public R&D: authors’ computation based on CRIS data tapes. 
Note: Total R&D is total commodity-specific agricultural R&D undertaken by SAES and USDA, exclusive of 
research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, 
aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules.  Other stone fruits include apricots, prunes, nectarines, and 
so on.   32
















Source: Extracted from CRIS data tapes. 
Note: Public agricultural research includes SAES and intramural USDA agricultural R&D spending, exclusive of 
research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, 
aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules.  
























Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Public Agricultural R&D, 1975–2004 
  1975 1980 1990 2000 2004
  (million dollars, 2000 prices) 
Expenditures   
Crops total  934.3 1,178.5 1,220.6 1,229.1  1,333.6
 S pecialty crops 336.8 412.5 434.1 434.3  461.6
 Other  (non specialty crops) 597.5 766.0 786.4 794.9  871.9
Livestock total  567.3 731.4 806.9 815.7  850.4
Other total (includes non-commodity) 691.5 724.0 771.0 834.4  1,064.7
All Research  2,193.1 2,633.9 2,798.4 2,879.2 3,248.8
      
Crops    
  Grains and oilseeds  275.5 365.4 412.4 426.9  451.3
  Pasture and forage 77.2 110.9 95.2 73.7  73.2
 Other  crop 244.8 289.8 278.8 294.3  347.5
 S pecialty crops 336.8 412.5 434.1 434.3  461.6
       Vegetables 131.5 168.1 195.3 193.9  197.8
       Fruits and nuts  148.0 172.9 172.1 170.5  187.5
       Ornamentals  57.3 71.4 66.7 69.9  76.4
Livestock    
 Beef  Cattle  180.6 247.6 224.2 181.2  195.3
 Dairy Cattle  142.7 168.8 175.7 162.2  155.5
 Poultry 98.7 103.9 116.5 113.4  121.1
 Swine  75.2 99.7 116.6 120.4  97.0
 Other  livestock  70.2 111.4 173.9 238.5  281.4
   (percentage)
Expenditure Shares    
Crops total  42.6 44.7 43.6 42.7  41.0
 S pecialty crops 15.4 15.7 15.5 15.1  14.2
 Other  (non specialty crops) 27.2 29.1 28.1 27.6  26.8
Livestock total  25.9 27.8 28.8 28.3  26.2
Other total (includes non-commodity) 31.5 27.5 27.6 29.0 32.8
All Research  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
      
Share of crop total    
  Grains and oilseeds  29.5 31.0 33.8 34.7  33.8
  Pasture and forage 8.3 9.4 7.8 6.0  5.5
 Other  crop 26.2 24.6 22.8 23.9  26.1
 S pecialty crops 36.0 35.0 35.6 35.3  34.6
       Vegetables 14.1 14.3 16.0 15.8  14.8
       Fruits and nuts  15.8 14.7 14.1 13.9  14.1
       Ornamentals  6.1 6.1 5.5 5.7  5.7
Share of livestock total    
 Beef  Cattle  31.8 33.9 27.8 22.2  23.0
 Dairy Cattle  25.1 23.1 21.8 19.9  18.3
 Poultry 17.4 14.2 14.4 13.9  14.2
 Swine  13.3 13.6 14.4 14.8  11.4
   Other livestock  12.4 15.2 21.5 29.2  33.1
 
Source: Extracted by authors from CRIS data tapes. 
Note: Nominal research expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in Pardey 
and Andersen (2007).  Public agricultural research includes all SAES and intramural USDA spending, exclusive of 
research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, 
aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. “Other total” includes food (not readily associated with specific 
plant and animal products), economic and other social science research basic R&D, and environmental and 
resource-related research not directly attributable to a particular commodity.   34
Figure 5:  Agricultural Research Intensity Ratios, 1970-2004 
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Total commodities All public agricultural R&D
Share non-commodity specific  
Source: See Figure 1 for details on R&D series.  Details on the cash receipts series are in Alston, Andersen, James, 
and Pardey (2007).  
Note: Here each agricultural research intensity ratio is the ratio of public agricultural research spending to the 
corresponding value of cash receipts. Public agricultural research includes all SAES and intramural USDA spending, 
exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory 
animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules.  Panel a includes only public research identified as 
commodity-specific R&D.  The “Total crop” series includes all research related to a specific crop or to multiple crops, 
and similarly so for the “Total Livestock” series.  “Total commodities” research is the sum of total crops and total 
livestock research.  Panel b repeats the “Total commodities” series from Panel a and by way of comparison also 
includes the intensity of non-commodity specific R&D performed by the public sector (expressed relative to the value 
of cash receipts) plus the ratio of all public agricultural R&D (total commodity plus non-commodity R&D) spending 
and the value of cash receipts.  Cash receipts exclude sales of forestry, aquaculture and fisheries products.  
Ostensibly, farm gate (or first point of sale) prices and quantities marketed by farms are used to form the cash 
receipts series.   35
Figure 6:  Research Spending versus Value of Sales, Various Commodities, 2004 
 
 
Source: See Figure 1 for details of R&D data.  Value shares of crop sales drawn from USDA-ERS farm cash receipts data downloaded from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/FarmIncome/. 
 
Note: Public agricultural research includes all SAES and intramural USDA spending as defined in the notes to Table 2. 
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Panel c: Value share of total crop sales (%)
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Source: See Figure 6 for details. 
 
Note: SAES and intramural USDA agricultural R&D spending is exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, 
recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, 
ponies, and mules. 
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Table 3: Rates of Return to Specialty Crops and Other Crops Research 








Share   
minimum maximum  average 
   count percent    percent per annum 
                
  Potato    11  21  47.6    1.05  100.0  44.8 
                
  Other specialty crops     8  33  48.5    1.4  92.8  30.7 
                
All specialty crops    19  54  48.1    1.05  100.0  36.2 
                
  Corn    20  62  8.1    -6.9  96.9  40.0 
                
  Wheat    32  103  24.3    11.1  97.0  47.9 
                
  Rice    31  15  6.5    11.44  99.6  54.8 
                
All crops    111  520  18.3    -7.4  100.0  44.5 
                   
Source: Extracted from data reported in Alston et al. (2000).    38
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Figure 9:  Prices of Specialty Crops—Nominal and Real Values, 1949-2004 
 

























Panel c:  Real Prices Deflated Using Implicit GDP Index 
 
 
Source:  Details on price series are in Alston, Andersen, James, and Pardey (2007).   40
Figure 10:  Real Movements in Prices of Specialty Crops, 1950-2004 
 
 






































































Table 4.  Growth in Production and Prices for Agricultural Products, 1949–2002 
Percentage Changes between 1949 and 2004 in 
Supply Growth  Commodity Category 
Production 
Nominal 
Price  Real Price  ε = 1.0  ε = 0.5 
          
Livestock 112  207  –55.1  167.1  139.6 
Field Crops  178    90  –72.4  250.4  214.2 
Vegetables 162  489  –27.9  189.9  176.0 
Fruits and Nuts  183  419  –22.5  205.5  194.3 
Greenhouse and Nursery  642  534  –20.2  662.2  652.1 
Source: Developed by authors. 
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Table 5.  California Commodities Covered by Marketing Programs, 2002 
Value of Production  
Commodity Category 
Total  Commodities Under 
Marketing Programs 
Share of Total California 
Value of Agricultural 
Production 
  $1,000 percent 
Field Crops  3,827.8  795.1  20.8 
Fruits and Nuts  9,705.3  7,139.7  73.5 
Vegetables 6,701.6  2,888.1  43.1 
Animal Products  7,090.7  5,586.2  78.8 
Nursery & Floral  3,310.1  365.9  11.1 
Total 30,635.5  16,775.1  54.8 
Source: Carman and Alston (2005). 
Note:  Fishery and Forestry are excluded.   43
Table 6.  Expenditure by California Marketing Programs, 2002 
 
Commodity Program  Administration 
Advertising and 
Promotion  Research Total      Shares 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     ({1 + 2} / 4) (3/4) 
   thousands of dollars budgeted     percent 
Federal Marketing Orders              
     Almonds   3,466.1  13,963.1  1,850.3  20,358.3    85.6  9.1 
     Dates   123.7  101.7  0  225.4    100  0 
     Grapes-California Desert   80.2  0  100.0  180.2    44.5  55.5 
     Kiwifruit   67.6  0  0  67.6    100  0 
     Nectarines   1,771.4  2,263.1  138.9  4,173.4    96.7  3.3 
     Olives   347.1  633.5  250.0  1,230.6    79.7  20.3 
     Peaches-Fresh   1,736.0  2,211.3  138.9  4,086.3    96.6  3.4 
     Pistachio               
     Potatoes, Oregon-California               
     Prunes-Dried   324.3  0  0  324.3    100  0 
     Raisins   1,986.5  0  0  4,621.3    43.0  0 
     Walnuts  710.6  1,470.0  1,045.0  3,225.6    67.6  32.4 
     Sub-Total  10,613.6 20,642.6 3,523.2  38,493.1    81.2 9.2 
              
State Marketing Orders              
     Alfalfa Seed  24.1  0  34.1  58.2    41.4  58.6 
     Artichoke Promotion  0  0  0  0       
     Cantaloupe  68.4  0  33.5  258.0    26.5  13.0 
     Carrot (fresh)  77.7  75.0  370.5  523.2    29.2  70.8 
     Celery  63.1  0  205.4  268.5    23.5  76.5 
     Cherry  223.2  1,452.7  165.0  1,840.9    91.0  9.0 
     Citrus   602.3  0  2,796.0  3,398.3    17.7  82.3 
     Dry Bean  186.9  194.0  177.7  558.6    68.2  31.8 
     Figs (Dried)  514.7  256.3  28.0  798.9    96.5  3.5 
     Garlic and Onion Dehydrator  254.2  0  0  469.0    54.2  0 
     Iceberg Lettuce Research  256.4  0  784.6  1,040.9    24.6  75.4 
     Melon Research  73.5  0  201.6  275.1    26.7  73.3 
     Manufacturing Milk  94.0  301.0  0  395.0    100  0 
     Market Milk  1,884.0  34,542.0  1,900.0  38,326.0    95.0  5.0 
     Milk (Fluid)  711.7  19,881.2  0.0  20,592.8    100  0 
     Peach (Cling)  151.8  1,825.3  355.0  2,332.1    84.8  15.2 
     Pear  122.3  1,749.5  176.3  2,048.1    91.4  8.6 
     Plum Order  546.7  2,179.9  99.6  3,763.6    72.4  2.6 
     Dried Plum  683.1  5,185.0  446.0  6,314.1    92.9  7.1 
     Potato Research  50.4  0  100.5  150.9    33.4  66.6 
     Raisin  1,294.8  4,460.7  725.0  6,480.5    88.8  11.2 
     Rice Research  194.9  0  2,177.3  2,372.2    8.2  91.8 
     Strawberry (Processing)  449.4  0  0  931.4    48.2  0 
     Tomato (Processing)  200.1  0  37.0  3,673.5    5.4  1.0 
     Wild Rice  23.6  40.0  1.0  64.6    98.5  1.5 
     Sub-Total  8,751.3 72,182.5  10,813.9  96,934.5    83.5  11.2 
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Commodity Program  Administration 
Advertising and 
Promotion Research  Total      Shares 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     ({1 + 2} / 4) (3/4) 
   thousands of dollars budgeted     percent 
State Commodity Commissions            
     Apple Commission  247.1  401.4  13.6  662.1    97.9  2.1 
     Asparagus Commission  175.7  529.1  111.5  816.2    86.3  13.7 
     Avocado Commission  2,245.0  9,762.5  1,615.6  13,623.1    88.1  11.9 
     Date Commission  28.6  0  90.0  118.6    24.1  75.9 
     Cut Flower Commission  267.3  999.0  117.9  1,384.2    91.5  8.5 
     Forest Products Commission  197.0  1,334.7  30.0  1,561.7    98.1  1.9 
     Grape Commission-Table  900.0  12,100.0  1,000.0  14,000.0    92.9  7.1 
     Grape Rootstock Commission  61.4  0  251.0  312.4    19.7  80.3 
     Kiwifruit Commission  123.2  224.0  14.9  362.1    95.9  4.1 
     Pepper Commission  54.1  0  145.0  199.1    27.2  72.8 
     Pistachio Commission  2,295.7  6,138.7  563.3  8,997.7    93.7  6.3 
     Rice Commission  1,088.6  1,879.2  26.0  3,023.7    98.1  0.9 
     Sea Urchin Commission               
     Sheep Commission  78.3  172.5  45.2  296.0    84.7  15.3 
     Strawberry Commission (Fresh)  1,324.6  4,839.4  1,576.9  7,740.9    79.6  20.4 
     Tomato Commission  499.9  1,095.0  318.7  1,913.6    83.3  16.7 
     Walnut Commission  711.6  7,115.8  625.0  8,452.4    92.6  7.4 
     Wheat Commission  368.0  195.0  176.6  739.6    76.1  23.9 
     Lake County Winegrape Com.  46.1  125.8  56.8  228.7    75.2  24.8 
     Lodi-Woodbridge Winegrape Com.  197.1  546.7  120.1  863.9    86.1  13.9 
     Sub-Total  10,909.1 47,458.8  6,898.1  65,296.0    89.4  10.6 
              
Councils              
     Beef Council  661.3  966.2  0  1,627.5    100  0 
     Dairy Council  1,282.1  4,591.4  0  5,873.5    100  0 
     Salmon Council  55.7  124.9  0  180.6    100  0 
     Sub-Total  1,999.1 5,682.4  0  7,681.5    100 0 
              
Grand Total  32,326.7 145,966.4  21,235.2  208,498.6      85.5  10.2 
Source: Carman and Alston (2005). 
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Table A1.  Rates of Return to Research on Specialty Crops and Other Crops 
 
Year         Number of  Minimum  Maximum 
published
a First  author  Subregion  Commodity observations  value  value 
Specialty Crop     (count) (percentage) 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Fruit, nut  6  5.70  48.69 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Fruit, nut  6  1.40  35.12 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Fruit, nut  11  11.88  102.50 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Fruit, nut  8  2.10  35.24 
*1986  Stranahan  J.  U.S. State  Fruit, nut  1  57.40  57.40 
1991  Norton  G.  All United States  Fruit, nut  1  33.00  33.00 
*1990a  Doeleman  J.  Australia, Asia/Pacific  Fruit, nut  3  32.00  130.00 
1994  Davis  J.  Australia, Asia/Pacific  Fruit, nut  3  34.00  48.00 
*1981  Moricochi  L.  Brazil  Fruit, nut  2  24.69  27.61 
*1988  Scobie  G.  Honduras  Fruit, nut  6  16.20  92.80 
*1988  Scobie  G.  Honduras  Fruit, nut  2  22.60  28.10 
*1989  Norton  G.  Eastern Caribbean  Fruit, nut  3  21.00  28.00 
*1990  Tobin  J.  Australia  Fruit, nut  6  210.00  1736.00 
*1992  Johnston  B.  Australia  Fruit, Nut  2  28.30  28.60 
*1992  Johnston  B.  Australia  Fruit, nut  2  87.20  87.30 
1994  Davis  J.  Australia  Fruit, nut  3  21.00  38.00 
1994a  Evenson  R.  Indonesia  Fruit, nut  3  >100   
1994a  Evenson  R.  Indonesia  Fruit, nut  1  80.00  80.00 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Potato  2  104.43  104.81 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Potato  2  69.36  70.63 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Potato  2  39.82  44.90 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Potato  3  1.05  10.06 
*1995  Araji  A.  All United States  Potato  1  79.02  79.02 
*1995  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Potato  6  41.26  153.71 
*1990 Horton    D.  Tunisia  Potato  1  80.00  80.00 
*1997  Chilver  A.  Egypt  Potato  1  28.00  28.00 
*1995  Fuglie  K.  West Asia, North Afr., Latin Amer./Carib.  Potato  3  45.00  74.00 
*1996  Chilver  A.  India,  Peru  Potato  1  22.00  22.00 
*1971  Barletta  N.  Mexico  Potato  1  69.00  69.00 
*1987 Norton    G.  Peru  Potato  4  22.00  42.00 
*1994  Cap  E.  Argentina  Potato  1  68.99  68.99 
*1994  Penna  J.  Argentina  Potato  3  52.60  61.23 
*1996  Alvarez  P.  Dominican Republic  Potato  1  27.00  27.00 
*1996  Ortiz  O.  Peru  Potato  1  30.00  30.00 
*1996  Fonseca  C.  Peru  Potato  1  26.00  26.00 
*1996  Bofu  S.  Global  Potato  1  65.00  65.00 
*1996  Khatana  V.  Global  Potato  4  10.00  33.20 
1991  Dey  M.  Bangladesh  Potato  1  129.00  129.00 
1994a  Evenson  R.  Indonesia  Potato  1  > 100   
1994a  Evenson  R.  Indonesia  Potato  1  100.00  100.00 
*1996  Bofu  S.  China  Potato  1  102.00  102.00 
*1996 Uyen    N.  Vietnam  Potato  1  70.00  70.00 
*1996  Rueda  J.  Rwanda  Burundi  Potato  1  84.00  84.00 
Other commodities          
1978b  Evenson  R.  All United States  All crops  1  55.00  55.00 
1993  Huffman  W.  All United States  All crops  3  41.60  62.60 
1996  Evenson  R.  All United States  All crops  1  90.00  90.00 
1996  Evenson  R.  All United States  All crops  3  40.00  57.00 
*1990  Macagno  L.  U.S. State  Barley  3  62.70  85.20 
*1992  Macagno  L.  U.S. State  Barley  2  84.80  90.90 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Beans  2  3.91  11.61 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Beans  3  4.30  7.30 
1989  Ojemakinde  A.  U.S. State  crops & livestock  1  19.61  19.61 
1993  Deininger  K.  All United States  Crops & livestock  18  27.20  384.40   46
Year         Number of  Minimum  Maximum 
published
a First  author  Subregion  Commodity observations  value  value 
1996  Evenson  R.  All United States  Crops & livestock  2  71.00  83.00 
1996  Evenson  R.  All United States  Crops & livestock  4  43.00  67.00 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Maize  1  59.26  59.26 
*1958  Griliches  Z.  All United States  Maize  1  37.10  37.10 
*1977  Easter  K.  U.S. State  Maize  16  320.00  1720.00 
*1980  Sundquist  W.  All United States  Maize  1  115.00  115.00 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Maize  3  14.63  17.04 
*1981  Otto  D.  All United States  Maize  3  162.40  177.70 
*1981  Otto  D.  U.S. State  Maize  2  87.10  291.40 
1970  Schmitz  A.  All United States  Other crop  2  55.74  76.92 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Other crop  6  35.83  47.58 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Other crop  16  1.72  161.20 
*1976  Bredahl  M.  All United States  Other crop  1  36.00  36.00 
*1977  Easter  K.  U.S. State  Other crop  16  60.00  470.00 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Other crop  6  17.85  32.38 
*1980  Sundquist  W.  All United States  Other crop  1  118.00  118.00 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Other crop  8  1.20  48.00 
*1981  Norton  G.  All United States  Other crop  10  31.00  85.00 
*1981  Otto  D.  All United States  Other crop  3  150.20  176.40 
*1981  Otto  D.  U.S. State  Other crop  1  233.70  233.70 
*1983  Smith  B.  All United States  Other crop  2  202.00  307.90 
1989  Huffman  W.  All United States  Other crop  1  62.00  62.00 
1991  Norton  G.  All United States  Other crop  3  19.00  34.00 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Pasture  2  36.66  38.51 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Pasture  3  8.07  17.20 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Rice  2  33.83  35.59 
1978  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Rice  2  11.44  21.26 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Sorghum  1  112.90  112.90 
*1958  Griliches  Z.  All United States  Sorghum  1  19.75  19.75 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Sorghum  1  74.42  74.42 
*1981  Otto  D.  All United States  Sorghum  3  101.20  134.10 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Wheat  1  191.00  191.00 
*1982  Blakeslee  L.  U.S. State  Wheat  8  -14.90  26.70 
*1980  Sim  R.  All United States  Wheat  5  25.23  61.96 
*1980  Sim  R.  U.S. State  Wheat  9  36.00  57.00 
*1980  Sim  R.  U.S. State  Wheat  2  27.00  42.00 
*1980  Sundquist  W.  All United States  Wheat  1  97.00  97.00 
1981  Araji  A.  All United States  Wheat  1  134.20  134.20 
*1981  Otto  D.  All United States  Wheat  3  80.60  126.30 
*1981  Otto  D.  U.S. State  Wheat  3  78.80  148.10 
*1989  Araji  A.  U.S. State  Wheat  3  29.00  71.00 
*1997  Barkley  A.  U.S. State  Wheat  1  39.00  39.00 
Source:  Extracted from Alston et al. (2000). 
Note:  n.a. indicates not available. 
 
 
 